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JN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,

NEWLY UNCOVERED
AUTHORITY

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 10710

STATE TAX

COMMISSION OF UTAH.
Defendant.
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Pursuant to Rule 75 (p)(2) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Defendant, State Tax
Commission of Utah, hereby directs the Court's
attention to the case of St. Louis Refrigerating
!_Cold Storage Co., v. The United States, 43
Fed. Supp., 476, (Ct. Cl. 1942) cited in Defendant's
brief herein but newly uncovered as to matters
referred to in the dissenting opinions of the Court

I anJ, therefore, pertinent to any rehearing herein.
I

In that case, the taxpayer was engaged in

I rhe manufacture and sale of ice,

the manufacture,

distribution and sale of refrigeration, and the
refrigeration of its own warehouses in which were
stored many kinds of perishable commodities. It
was alleged that the taxes were erroneously assessed
2nd collected under Section 616 of the Revenue Act

of 1932, the language of which has been conceded
to have been before the Utah legislature when Section
~9-15-4

UCA 1953 as amended was enacted. The

Court defined the issue as "whether Plaintiff's use
of electrical energy is commercial consumption as

defined in the quoted provision of the Revenue Act. "

I As the entire body of the opinion is pertinent to
I various issues
I

1

opinions of the Utah Supreme Court in Union Pacific

~oad Co. v. State Tax Commission,

1--I

I

raised in the majority and dissenting

-

Utah

426 Pac. 2d 231, the Court's attention is

I
- 2 -

directed to the opinion which, in substantial part

µrovides:
"It is earnestly insisted by plaintiff that
there is a zone between commerce and industry and
that plaintiff's business in the main is within this
twilight zone.
"There is no distinction written into the
termt> of the taxing provisions. The only exception
named in the statutes is energy furnished the Government or political subdivisions thereof.
"True, Treasury Regulations 42 recognize
certain named activities as neither commercial
nor industrial within the meaning of the Act, but
such regulations do not name the type of business
actively involved in this case as falling between the
two classifications. Besides, regulations may not
serve to change the provisions of a statute.
"Plaintiff insists that the intention of the Congress, as reflected in the history of the legislation,
was to reach only the individual consumers and the
~mall business concerns and not users on a large
scale.
"The discussions in the Congress covered
a wide range. Many individual statements were
made. These are quoted in extenso by both parties
ll'lth conflicting interpretations. However, the conterence report, which was made by a joint conference
committee representing both the Senate and the House,
and which was the last committee explanation before
lht: final vote was taken, contained the following explanation of the taxing provision which is involved

I

l
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" 'The House recedes with an amendment
a tax of 3 per cent of the price paid for
electrical energy for domestic or commercial use
(as distinguished from industrial use) , to be paid
by the purchaser and collected by the vendor, with
necessary administrative provisions and an exemption
in the case of electrical energy sold to the United
States, any State or Territory or political subdivision
thereof, or the District of Columbia.'
~ubstituting

"If any ambiguity existed and any explanations

were needed apart from the language of the statute,
this final joint conference committee report makes
il clear that it was the intention that the term 'commercial' should have a meaning broader than the
restricted sense which plaintiff would have us apply.
!t explains that the tax applies to commercial as
distinguished from industrial use. It then exempts
only electrical energy sold to the Government,
National or State, or a political subdivision thereof.

"We may add that this seems that the natural
construction of the wording of the statute.
"The use of the two terms by way of contrast
followed by the reference to political subdivisions
as the only named exemption would seem to preclude
the intermediate classification which plaintiff attempts
to read into the statute.
"It hardly seems necessary to go behind the
clear wording of the statute. Certainly it is unnecessary to go behind the joint conference committee
report into the maze of discussion and interpretation
by the indi victual Members of the Congress when the
:;tat1ne itself, which is the final product of their
labors, is couched in simple language clearly ex-

pressed.
"We think some of the confusion has arisen
irum the effort on the part of the administrative
Jnit to establish an intermediate field between commerce and industry. This makes the problem more
difficult. Since there are no definite calls, the construction of two dividing lines instead of one is made
necessary, and the extent of such field, if established,
can be measured only by the somewhat varying use
of otherwise well-known words.
"In the general understanding commerce and
Industry cover the entire business field and while it
i8 sometimes difficult to know whether a borderline business falls mainly in the field of commerce
or industry it is far less difficult than to attempt to
establish shadowy lines. It is far less complicated
to follow the generally accepted meaning of the terms
which are used in the taxing statute.
"This conclusion is further strengthened by
the wording of the Act of June 16, 1933, in which
section 616 is reenacted with only one change pertaining
to exemptions, namely the exemption of publicly owned
electric and power plants. The inclusion of this
exemption indicates the exclusion of other similar
exemptions. While the Act of 1933 has no application to the period involved in the instant case, the
naming of the exemption supports the conclusion
that the Congress had no thought of establishing
the intermediate business field for which plaintiff
contends. "

** *

"The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has
a most difficult task in interpreting the numerous
taxing statutes and the many statutory changes that
i
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,re necessarily made from time to time by the

Congress to fit the vase and rapidly changing bus1iicss structure of the country. But we must con;:;rrue the language of the Act as we find it.
"It is contended by plaintiff that Congress
Jfler the issuance of the Treasury Regulations 42
1i;pcatedly reenacted the tax law without substantial
change in this provision, thus confirming the Com missioner's action. The contention loses much of
lts force in the light of the numerous rulings, decisions, and exceptions that have been made necessary
hy the complicated and widely varying nature of the
many businesses affected. But if this viewpoint is
Jccepted the fact remains that the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, who prepared the regulations, also
held that plaintiff's business did not fall within the
Jontaxable intermediate field. It would be rather
1llogical to hold that the Government would be bound
by the Commissioner's construction limiting the
application of the statute as expressed in the regulalions, and at the same time disregard the Commissioner's interpretation of those limits.
"Even if the term 'commercial' were conin the narrower sense for which plaintiff
contends, it would not necessarily follow that it
would be exempt from the tax. With the single
exception of the manufacture of ice, plaintiff's
activities are predominantly commercial. Its
)ervicing is commercial. Its business is primarily
cr)mrnercial. It follows the product in the process
uf distribution. Its activities are an integral part
of the current or stream of commerce. Thus,
. regardless of whether the Commissioner of Internal
1 Revenue properly construed the Act in undertaking
I 0Yregulation to exempt certain businesses on the
~trued

I

I
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ground that they are neither industrial nor com-

mcrcial, the plaintiff's business is subject to the
I rax.
1

I

"It follows that plaintiff's petition must be
dismissed and it is so ordered."

L

Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
HENRY L. ADAMS
Assistant Attorney General
F. BURTON HOWARD
Special Assistant
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
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